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Abstract: The main goal of this article is to scrutinize the contemporary British sources, 
in order to establish what they say about the causes of the insurrection in Herzegovina 
which marked the beginning of the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878. The official reports 
of British diplomats, the observations of newspaper correspondents, and the instruc-
tions of London policy makers support the conclusion that the immediate cause of 
the insurrection was agrarian discontent, especially tithe collecting. In considering 
the “external influences” on the outbreak of the insurrection, the British emphasized 
the role of Austria-Hungary and Montenegro. Behind these countries, they saw the 
shadow of the Three Emperors’ League, which was perceived as the main threat to the 
Ottoman Empire and, consequently, to the balance of power in Europe. Serbia was 
not seen as directly involved in the events in Herzegovina. Later on, at the time of 
Prince Milan’s visit to Vienna, and as volunteers from Serbia began to be despatched 
to Herzegovina, the British diplomats increasingly perceived Serbia, in addition to 
Montenegro, as another tool of the Three Emperors’ League.
Keywords: Great Britain, Foreign Office, uprising in Herzegovina, Eastern Question, 
Austria-Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Russia 
I
t is a well known fact that the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 was sparked 
by an uprising of unruly highlanders in Herzegovina. But there is no de-
finitive explanation as to why and how the Herzegovinian uprising began. 
That means that we do not know exactly why one of the most dangerous 
European crises of the nineteenth century broke out.
All authors consider the causes of the Herzegovinian uprising to be the 
result of a specific mix of domestic and foreign influences. Most of them see 
the immediate cause in agrarian discontent. However, all unanimity of opin-
ion disappears when it comes to explaining the “external” factor. Both Milo-
rad Ekmečić and Vasa Čubrilović suggest that it was a national revolt of the 
Serbs, but they also emphasize the importance of the 1858 Ottoman land law 
and land reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after Omar Pasha Latas finally 
crushed the resistance of the local Muslim nobility. The state-owned timars 
were turned into begs’ private property, which bitterly disappointed the Chris-
tian serfs, shattering their last hopes of regaining their former bashtinas from 
the Sultan’s state property. Both Ekmečić and Čubrilović lay emphasis on the 
peasants’ being enraged at the Ottoman tax system, and especially at mer-
ciless tithe collectors. There were also influences from Montenegro, Serbia, 
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Austria-Hungary and Russia, but rather than being the cause of the insurrec-
tion, they gained real importance only during its course.1 However, Ekmečić 
also stresses the Balkan aspirations of the Three Emperors’ League, notably 
Austria-Hungary which exerted influence on the movement in Herzegovina 
through the local Catholic population; there even are indications of the Dual 
Monarchy’s cooperation with the Prince of Montenegro, Nikola I Petrović.2 
David Harris likewise argues that the immediate cause of the insurrection is 
to be found in “rental obligations and more especially in the ruthless taxation 
suffered by the Christian population”. Moreover, he emphasizes that it was a 
national revolt, rooted in the tradition of the “ballads lamenting ‘the damned 
day of Kossovo’.”4 Also, the peasants of Herzegovina were perfectly aware of 
their relatives’ much better living conditions in the neighbouring Habsburg 
Empire, in Serbia or in Montenegro.5 David Mackenzie contends that the 
revolt was a “spontaneous protest by the Christian merchants and peasants 
against heavy taxation and oppressive rule” and that “there is no evidence that 
insurrection was organised by an outside power”.6 Humphrey Sumner agrees 
with Arthur Evans, the Manchester Guardian correspondent at the time, that 
the “insurrection was in its origin Agrarian rather than Political”, but adds 
that it “became a weapon in the hands of Austrian, Russian, and Serbian 
Slav societies, of Montenegrin captains, and of the pandours of the border 
district”.7
1 M. Ekmečić, Dugo kretanje između klanja i oranja: Istorija Srba u Novom veku (1492–1992) 
(Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2007), 269–278; M. Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije, vol. II 
(Belgrade: Prosveta, 1989), 279–282; M. Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875–1878 (Belgrade: 
Službeni list SRJ and Balkanološki institut SANU, 1996), 25–92; V. Čubrilović, Bosanski 
ustanak 1875–1878 (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ and Balkanološki institut SANU, 1996), 
19–28, 45–52. On the land reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see also D. Berić, Us-
tanak u Hercegovini 1852–1862 (Belgrade–Novi Sad: SANU, 1994), 587–620; V. Popović, 
Agrarno pitanje u Bosni i turski neredi za vreme reformnog režima Abdul-Medžida (1839–
1861) (Belgrade: SANU, 1949), 279–285. On different aspects of the 1858 land law see 
H. Inalcik and D. Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. II: 
1600–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 856–861.
2 Ekmečić, Dugo kretanje, 278–279; Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije II, 28–284; see also 
Čubrilović, Bosanski ustanak, 52–57.
 D. Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875–1878: The First Year (Stan-
ford University Press and Oxford University Press, 196), 17.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 D. MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875–1878 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1967), 1.
7 B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870–1880 (Hamden, CT and London: Archon 
Books, 1962), 141; A. J. Evans, Through Bosnia and Herzegovina on Foot, During the M. Ković, The 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina 57
George Hoover Rupp, on the other hand, tends to lay emphasis on 
foreign influences, particularly “the intrigues and propaganda of both the 
Pan-Slavs and the agents of the Bosnian minded Military Group in Aus-
tria”, arguing that “of these the Pan-Slavs were much more active”.8 Pan-Slav 
intrigues were the main cause of the insurrection according to Wertheimer’s 
biography of Andrássy as well,9 which in fact was a view shared by a large 
part of European public opinion at the time of the insurrection. According 
to the recently published documents from Russian archives, however, the 
Russian consuls in Mostar, Sarajevo and Dubrovnik believed that the upris-
ing was caused by heavy taxation and Ottoman incompetence. Moreover, 
they suspected that there was secret Austrian influence among the insur-
gents.10 Robert William Seton-Watson, although describing the situation 
in the Ottoman Empire, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as “untenable”, put 
emphasis on the ambitions of the military party in Vienna, especially one of 
its leaders, the governor of Dalmatia, General Gavrilo Rodić, who was “in 
secret contact with the Bosnian leaders”.11 Seton-Watson also remarked that 
the Russian consul in Dubrovnik, Alexander Yonin, was “in direct contact 
with the insurgent chiefs”.12 According to Mihailo D. Stojanović, the insur-
rection “was the result of the propaganda and preparations which Serbia 
carried out with the view of organising a general rising of the Christians”.1 
More than agrarian conditions, influences from Serbia, Montenegro, Aus-
trian Dalmatia and Croatia are stressed in Richard Millman’s work.14
The main goal of this article is to scrutinize the contemporary Brit-
ish sources in order to establish what they say about the causes of the 1875 
insurrection in Herzegovina. The main source of information will be the re-
Insurrection, August and September 1875 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1877), 
4–6.
8 G. H. Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876–1878 (Harvard Univer-
sity Press and H. Milford Oxford University Press, 1941), 5.
9 E. von Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrassy, sein Leben und seine Zeit, vol. II (Stuttgart: 
Stuttgart Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 194), 251.
10 Yonin to Jomini, Ragusa, 5/7 July 1875, published in Rossiya i vosstanie v Bosnii 
i Gercegovine 1875–1878: Dokumenty, eds. V. I. Kosik et al. (Moscow: Indrik, 2008), 
17–24.
11 R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question. A Study in Diplo-
macy and Party Politics (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1971), 18.
12 Ibid., 19.
1 M. Stojanović, The Great Powers and the Balkans 1875–1878 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 199), 1–18.
14 R. Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question 1875–1878 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), 15.Balcanica XLI 58
ports produced in July and August 1875 by the British diplomats serving in 
the region, being closest to the events. The opinions of London policy mak-
ers and British newspaper correspondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
will be analyzed as well.
In June and July 1875, when the uprising broke out, most diplomats 
were on vacation in European spas and capitals. By contrast, the British 
consuls in Sarajevo and Dubrovnik, as well as the ambassador in Constanti-
nople, were at their offices, busy gathering information and sending reports 
to Lord Derby, foreign secretary in the Conservative cabinet of Benjamin 
Disraeli.
A pronounced Turkophile, as the contemporary British diplomats 
serving in the Balkans tended to be,15 the British consul in Sarajevo, Wil-
liam Holmes, relied almost exclusively on information supplied by Dervish 
Pasha, governor general of Bosnia, and by other Ottoman officials. Holmes 
knew about Austria-Hungary’s aspirations regarding Bosnia and Herze-
govina,16 but his reports of June 1875 described Montenegro as the main 
troublemaker in Herzegovina. He was aware of the policies of Prince Niko-
la, who was using his influence in this troubled region to extract territorial 
gains from the Porte. Holmes supported the Ottoman effort to settle the 
border question with Montenegro through Constant Effendi’s diplomatic 
mission to Cetinje. He shrewdly analyzed the position of Montenegro in 
relation to the Ottoman Empire: “The possession of Montenegro for Turkey 
would simply be a large and useless expense, and quarrels with her have the 
same result without any possible advantage. It is therefore interest of Turkey 
that Montenegro should be friendly, peaceful and contented.”17 Nonethe-
less, he reported that Prince Nikola, whom he described as a man of “bad 
faith” who did not “carry out his engagements”,18 “has hopes that some time 
or other Bosnia and the Herzegovina will come under his government, but 
in the case of complications arising which give these provinces to Austria, 
he knows that his aspirations will be unattainable.”19
15 G. L. Iseminger, “The Old Turkish Hands: The British Levantine Consuls, 1856–
1876”, Middle East Journal 22/ (1968), 297–16; see also The Duke of Argyll, The 
Eastern Question. From the Treaty of Paris 1856 to the Treaty of Berlin 1878, and to the 
Second Afghan war, vol. I (London: Strahan & Company Limited, 1879), 6–41; M. 
Ković, “Vojvoda Argajl i Istočno pitanje”, Mitološki zbornik 19 (2008), 18.
16 The National Archives (NA), Foreign Office (FO), 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to 
Elliot, Bosna Serai, 1 July 1875.
17 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 18 June 1875.
18 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 1 July 1875.
19 Ibid.M. Ković, The 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina 59
Holmes expressed suspicion about Montenegro in the very first re-
port on the disturbances he sent on 2 July 1875. He claimed that everything 
was organized by a group of 164 refugees from Herzegovina, who had win-
tered in Montenegro, and then reappeared in Herzegovina in revolt, killing 
everyone who tried to negotiate with the Ottoman authorities.20 Dervish 
Pasha told Holmes that Prince Nikola was not involved in the events, but 
he was not so sure that his Montenegrins were “equally blameless”.21 Con-
stant Effendi informed Holmes about his mission to Cetinje, claiming that 
the Prince assured him that the disturbances were the result of “the Servian 
intrigue”: “He spoke bitterly of Servia, and said she was always endeav-
ouring to put him in a false position, and make the Turks to think he was 
‘incorrible’.”22 The Prince allegedly expressed his belief that “at the bottom 
of the present disturbance” was “the priest called Nikifor”, who was “the 
constant instrument of the Servian intrigue”.2 He was obviously trying to 
divert attention towards Serbia and put the blame for all the troubles on 
Nićifor Dučić, a monk, historian and guerrilla leader from Herzegovina, his 
close collaborator in the past, who was now living in Belgrade. As we shall 
see, however, the reports of the British consuls were not to refer to Serbia 
as the probable instigator of the disturbances in Herzegovina until August 
1875, while Dučić’s name had never resurfaced. 
On the other hand, Holmes was perfectly aware of the everyday 
hardships that the Herzegovinian peasants faced: “There is no doubt that 
these people feel oppressed and overtaxed. The Government is always urg-
ing the sale of the taxes at yearly increasing and really exorbitant prices, 
and in all complaint invariably side with the purchasers, being interested to 
secure them a profit to ensure still higher bidding the ensuing year.”24 He 
also knew that the small town of Nevesinje, where the uprising was to be 
ignited, was not included in a more lenient taxation system established in 
the neighbouring districts after their rebellion of 1861.25
The attack on a Turkish caravan at Cvetna Poljana (Flowery Field) 
near Nevesinje carried out on 5th July was reported by Holmes four days 
20 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 2 July 1875. On these 
refugees, see V. Čubrilović, Bosanski ustanak, 55–57. On the role of Montenegro in the 
outbreak of the uprising see also V. Ćorović, “Hercegovački ustanak 1875. godine”, in 
Spomenica o Hercegovačkom ustanku 1875. godine (Belgrade: Odbor za podizanje Neves-
injskog spomenika, 1928), v–xix.
21 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 2 July 1875.
22 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.Balcanica XLI 60
later. According to his account, “the disaffected peasants robbed the caravan 
and decapitated five innocent Turkish merchants”.26 Holmes also reported 
that another “band” of rebels had seized the bridge over the Krupa river, 
cutting the road between Mostar and Metković.27
Holmes failed to mention that this “band” was made up of Catho-
lics, which was a trail that could lead to Vienna and nourish old suspi-
cions, rekindled in April and May 1875 by the Emperor Franz Joseph’s long 
visit to Dalmatia, where he received the Catholics from Herzegovina and 
listened compassionately to their grievances. In Kotor he met the Prince 
of Montenegro. Some historians believe that the Montenegrin Prince and 
the Habsburg Emperor came to an understanding, and that Prince Nikola 
might have had Russian support in that. It is known that the Crown Coun-
cil convened in Vienna on 29 January 1875 had already made the decision 
to send Habsburg troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina should a conflict 
arise between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire. In May 1875, shortly 
after Franz Joseph left Dalmatia, the Montenegrin Prince asked the Three 
Emperors’ League to countenance Montenegro’s territorial expansion.28
A day after Holmes sent his report, the British chargé d’affaires in 
Vienna, R. Percy Ffrench, forwarded to Derby the telegram he had just 
received from Dubrovnik, where consul Taylor informed him about fight-
ing on the Krupa, but also noted that the insurgents “have hoisted Austrian 
flag at two places”.29 In Taylor’s view, “Montenegro seemingly directs the 
revolt underhand”.0 A few days later, Percy Ffrench sent a more detailed 
report about the clashes on the Krupa and at Rasno, describing the flight 
of refugees from the lower Neretva to Metković in Austrian territory. As 
he also remarked, “the suspicion exists that the whole thing may have been 
fomented by the southern Pan-Slavists in order to disturb and to create 
confusion in the relations between Austria and Turkey”.1 Percy Ffrench did 
not specify who those “southern Pan-Slavists” were — pro-Russian Pan-
Slavs or South-Slav agitators from Dalmatia.
26 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 9 July 1875. On the 
attack of Pero Tunguz’s hajduks on a Turkish caravan on 5 July, see D. Tunguz-Perović, 
“Nevesinjska puška”, in Spomenica o Hercegovačkom ustanku, 45–54; Čubrilović, Bosanski 
ustanak, 59–60.
27 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 9 July 1875.
28 Rupp, Wavering Friendship, 4-45; Ekmečić, Dugo kretanje, 278–279; Ekmečić, Stvar-
anje Jugoslavije II, 28–284.
29 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Ffrench to Derby, Vienna, 10 July 1875.
0 Ibid.; M. Ković, “Velika Britanija i Bosna i Hercegovina u Istočnoj krizi (1875–1878)”, 
Zbornik za istoriju Bosne i Hercegovine 6 (2009), 161–162.
1 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Ffrench to Derby, Vienna, 15 July 1875.M. Ković, The 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina 61
When  Holmes  eventually  learnt  from  Dervish  Pasha  that  both 
Catholics and Orthodox took part in the revolt, he worriedly described the 
situation as “a circumstance which has never before occurred in troubled 
times”.2 He pointed to the fact that the Austrian Vice-Consul in Trebinje 
and a number of Roman Catholic priests had left Herzegovina for Dalma-
tia in fear of Muslim retribution. Although Dervish Pasha claimed “that 
their departure has been made with the sole intention of increasing the 
agitation”, a few days later Holmes reported that, thanks to the influence 
of the bishop of Mostar and some Christian and Muslim “notables”, the 
Catholics “retired to their homes”.4
The correspondent for the Times in Herzegovina, William James 
Stillman, a Pre-Raphaelite painter and photographer, who had supported 
the Cretan uprising of 1866–1869 while serving as U.S. consul in Crete,5 
maintained that the immediate cause of the insurrection in Herzegovina 
was the injustice and violence which were chronic and endemic in the Ot-
toman Empire.6 He also believed, however, that it was inspired by Franz 
Joseph’s visit to Dalmatia. In his view, it started as a revolt of “the Catho-
lic population between Popovo and Gabela”, who “anticipated an Austrian 
intervention”.7 While travelling to Herzegovina in late August 1875, he 
found in Trieste “a committee for aiding the movement”, whose “politi-
cal tone” was “distinctly Austrian, and the members of the committee were 
all Dalmatians, with whom, as with the Dalmatian patriots generally, the 
best end of the affair would be the union of Bosnia and part, at least, of 
Herzegovina to Dalmatia. There was no Russian leaning or influence”.8 
Consequently, at the very beginning the insurrection was “entirely in the 
hands of the Austrian Slavs, the committees of Zara and Ragusa being the 
chief”.9 Stillman observed that at that time the Catholics were “the most 
enthusiastic in the revolt” and that “the Austrian authorities showed an ex-
2 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 24 July 1875.
 Ibid.
4 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 29 July 1875.
5 See W. J. Stillman, The Cretan Insurrection of 1866–7–8 (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1874); W. J. Stillman, The Autobiography of a Journalist, vol. II (Boston and 
New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1901), 98–45.
6 W. J. Stillman, Herzegovina and the Late Uprising: The Causes of the Latter and the 
Remedies (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1877), 1–2, 8–9.
7 Ibid., 2–.
8 Ibid., 8.
9 Ibid., 12.Balcanica XLI 62
traordinary amount of complaisance to the insurgents”.40 “But the Catho-
lics were tindery fuel, quickly kindled and quickly spent.”41 As the help 
they hoped for did not come, they gave up the fight. Stillman even claimed 
that the uprising was dying out at the time, and that it was only the Great 
Powers’ Consular Commission of August 1875 that rekindled it, giving the 
insurgents international encouragement and importance.42
Another reason for the revolt of the Herzegovinian Catholics, apart 
from the Emperor’s visit to Dalmatia, in the opinion of the Manchester 
Guardian’s correspondent and future famous archaeologist, Arthur Evans, 
was the dissatisfaction of the local Franciscans with infringement of some of 
their privileges and the Sultan’s delay in confirming their fermans. Accord-
ing to Evans, by pushing their congregation into the revolt, the Franciscans 
wanted to demonstrate the extent and value of their influence among the 
“Latin” population.4 He also observed, however, that “many of the Roman 
Catholics have deserted the national cause”, and claimed that the uprising 
did not really begin until the Orthodox in the Nevesinje district rose up. 
Moreover, he shared Stillman’s view that the real cause of the uprising was 
not “external agitation”, but “the oppression of the tithe-farmers”,44 arguing 
that “it is mainly an agrarian war”.45 To the extreme poverty of the local 
population and the bad harvest of 1874, he added that the Herzegovinian 
rebel “simply wanted to obtain a fair share of what he earned with the sweat 
of his brow, to gain security of life and limb and the honour of his wife and 
children, to be allowed at least to live”.46 Both Stillman and Evans harshly 
criticized the Turcophile attitude of William Holmes and the Foreign Of-
fice. Stillman described Holmes’s reports as “Arabian Nights”,47 while Ev-
ans’s public debate with Holmes continued in the Manchester Guardian and 
Parliament.48 However, Stillman and Evans were not essentially opposed to 
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 12–14.
4 Evans, Through Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7.
44 Ibid., 1.
45 Ibid., 4.
46 Ibid., 6.
47 Stillman, Herzegovina, 60. In vol. II of his Autobiography, 52–5, published almost 
thirty years later, Stillman claims that Elliot forced Holmes into writing Turkophile 
reports.  
48 See A. J. Evans, Illyrian Letters: A Revised Selection of Correspondence From the Illyrian 
Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, 
Addressed to the ‘Manchester Guardian’ During the Year 1877 (London: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1878), 45–49, 84–91.M. Ković, The 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina 6
Britain’s official policy in the East. They both believed that the solution lay 
in an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; moreover, 
Stillman suggested that a “part” of Herzegovina “may be wisely united to 
Montenegro”.49
Long after the revolt of the Catholics had reached its peak in June 
1875, Taylor reported that in Dubrovnik “all sympathize deeply with the 
insurgents and, through a local Committee, afford them every help and 
assistance”.50 He even claimed that Austria’s “local official action with the 
respect to them [insurgents] is neither neutral, assuring, nor loyal towards 
the Sultan”.51 Taylor blamed not only Austrian local authorities, but Mon-
tenegro as well. Arguing that “their parade of non-intervention seems an 
absurd fiction”, he believed it obvious that considering the strict press laws 
of both countries neither the Crnogorac of Cetinje nor the Narodni list and 
Nazionale of Zadar could have been able to publish their belligerent articles 
about the uprising in Herzegovina without official backing.52 Even Holmes 
noted that Austria was doing nothing to stop the agitation, that “the great-
est excitement prevails in Dalmatia and Croatia”, and that “the committees 
have been formed in Agram, Ragusa and Trieste”.5
While reports from Dalmatia were going to Vienna, where Percy 
Ffrench was still in charge of affairs, in the absence of the ambassador, Sir 
Andrew Buchanan, the reports from the Ottoman Empire were being sent 
to Constantinople, where ambassador Henry Elliot was struggling to piece 
together a broader picture. Elliot embraced Holmes’s interpretation of the 
beginning of the uprising, with the refugees returning from Montenegro as 
instigators of the revolt, and the taxation as its immediate cause.54 However, 
he was sure that Russia, through the Three Emperors’ League, was directing 
the events, using Montenegro as her tool and pushing Austria-Hungary 
into the Sultan’s lands. Safvet Pasha, Ottoman foreign minister, only deep-
ened Elliot’s suspicion by stating that the Austrian chargé d’affaires had 
supported the idea of sending more Ottoman troops to Herzegovina to 
help crush the revolt, in contrast to the Russian chargé d’affaires, who had 
remarked that “it would be better not to be precipitate”. Elliot also observed 
49 Stillman, Herzegovina, 15; Evans, Illyrian Letters, 67–70, 8, 102–10, 246–255.
50 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Taylor to Elliot, Ragusa, 4 August 1875.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
5 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 6 August 1875.
54 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 1 July 1875. According to 
Evans, Through Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8–9, and Stillman, Herzegovina, 9–11, 
some of those refugees, upon returning from Montenegro, were killed by the Turks, 
which was one of the causes of the revolt.Balcanica XLI 64
that the Herzegovinian refugees who started the revolt had been able to 
return from Montenegro owing to the special concern and help of the Rus-
sian embassy in Constantinople.55 He advised Safvet Pasha and the Porte 
not to fear Austria-Hungary or Russia, but to send more troops to Herze-
govina and to “adopt such measures as might seem necessary to prevent an 
extension of the spirit of insubordination”.56 In the subsequent weeks, Elliot 
and Holmes kept on encouraging the Ottomans to send troops “to these 
semi-barbarous districts” against the rebels who, in Elliot’s words, “carried 
on an extensive system of plunder and murder, exercising terrorism over the 
inhabitants of the different villages”.57 The insurrection was to be crushed 
without delay in order to preclude the involvement of the Three Emperors’ 
League. “That the movement is due to the policy followed by the three 
northern Powers during the last six months scarcely admits of a reasonable 
doubt, although it is not to be supposed that Austria intended or desired it 
to be followed by any such result. Practically, but unconsciously, that Power 
has been acting as a cat’s-paw to Russia,” Elliot wrote.58 Lord Derby ap-
proved all steps taken by Elliot.59
Elliot’s suspicion that the Three Emperors’ League was secretly en-
couraging the insurrection was strengthened by the reports of the British 
diplomats from Paris and Berlin. The French foreign minister, Duc de De-
cazes, maintained that the Three Emperors’ League was paving the way for 
an Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.60 Unlike Elliot, the 
French official believed that Austria-Hungary was exploiting the events in 
order to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. The president of the Republic, 
Marshal Mac-Mahon, told the British ambassador, Lord Lyons, that the 
insurrection occurred at a “very inopportune moment” for “the Western 
Powers”, France and Britain, and expressed his fear that the members of 
the League, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, could “do pretty much 
as they pleased in the East”. He even suspected that Bismarck’s Germany 
might take advantage of the reopening of the Eastern Question to settle 
old scores with France.61 At the same time, the chargé d’affaires in Berlin, 
55 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 14 July 1875.
56 Ibid.
57 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 20 July 1875; see also NA, FO, 
1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 24 July 1875, 29 July 1875, and 6 
August 1875; NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 10 August 1875, 11 
August 1875, 17 August 1875 and 18 August 1875.
58 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 14 July 1875.
59 NA, FO, 1875, Derby to Elliot, London, 0 July 1875 and 19 August 1875.
60 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Duc Decazes to Marquis d’Harcourt, Paris, 6 August 
1875 (Marquis d’Harcourt’s communication to the Earl of Derby of 7 August 1875). 
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Macdonnell, reported that the German secretary of state for foreign affaires, 
Von Bülow, had told him that in the case of the Sultan’s failure to pacify 
Herzegovina, “the ‘entente parfaitement cordiale’ which exists between the 
three Emperors might certainly induce His Imperial Majesty to tender his 
good offices towards the re-establishment and the maintenance of peace”.62 
On 20th August, Macdonnell sent an even more disturbing telegram: “The 
Prince [Bismarck] is of opinion that Austrian Government are not act-
ing discreetly. Reports are current of an Austrian armed intervention. The 
Bourse for the first time has been affected by reports on this account.”6
What was the reaction of the decision-makers in London to all those 
reports and news? Like Mac-Mahon, Disraeli suspected that the three Em-
perors were preparing the ground to settle the Eastern Question on their 
own, to the exclusion of Britain. He believed that Russia and the Habsburg 
Monarchy would try to divide the Sultan’s Balkan possessions between 
them, while Germany would seek to prevent France from restoring her 
strength. In that way both Britain’s prestige and the European balance of 
power would suffer.64 
When the insurrection broke out, Disraeli first focused suspicion on 
Vienna. The first action he took as soon as he heard the news was to tele-
graph the instructions to the ambassador in Vienna to find out what the 
“real wishes” of the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Count Gyula An-
drássy, were. As the reply from Vienna was reassuring, Disraeli concluded 
that, should Austria-Hungary really remain neutral as Andrássy had prom-
ised, the rebellion would be quashed quickly.65
Lord Derby too, in the first diary entry concerning the uprising, 
claimed that “unless the insurgents are backed up by Austria or Russia, or 
both, there is no serious danger”.66 By 0th August, Derby still believed that 
Austria-Hungary was responsible for the outbreak of the revolt.67
62 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Macdonell to Lord Derby, Berlin, 1 August 1875.
6 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Macdonell to Lord Derby, Berlin, 20 August 1875.
64 Disraeli Project, Disraeli to Lady Bradford, Bretby Park, 6 September 1875; The Let-
ters of Disraeli to Lady Bradford and Lady Chesterfiﾭeld, vol. I, ed. The Marquis of Zetland 
(London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1929), 279; W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, The 
Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfiﾭeld, vol. II (New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1929), 885; M. Ković, Disraeli and the Eastern Question (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011), 89–90.
65 Ibid., 87-88.
66 4 August 1875, in The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826–93). 
Between September 1869 and March 1878, ed. J. Vincent (London: Royal Historical So-
ciety, 1994), 24.
67 0 August 1875, in Diaries, 240; Ković, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, 88.Balcanica XLI 66
Serbia, in contrast to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro and Russia, was 
not seen by the British as the instigator of the insurrection. However, from 
the beginning of August 1875, she was increasingly perceived as yet another 
tool in the hands of Russia and the Three Emperors’ League in the East. 
On 24th July 1875, the British consul general in Belgrade, William White, 
was still reporting about the Serbian government’s loyal attitude towards 
the Porte.68 However, Prince Milan Obrenović’s visit to Vienna gave rise 
to suspicion. On rd August, White passed on the official explanation that 
the young Prince was travelling “on the private ground”, noting that “it has 
been hinted” that “there is a matrimonial project on foot”.69 But White also 
reported that Milan planned to meet the Emperor Franz Joseph and An-
drássy, suspecting that the Prince might use “the ultimate special protection 
of the three military Empires, for defying the authority of the Porte and 
assuming a hostile attitude”.70 White pointed to the possibility that Prince 
Milan, in view of the approaching election, might try to use the events in 
Herzegovina to revitalize his popularity in response to pressure from Ser-
bian patriotic public opinion. White also reported that one of his ministers 
“was heard” say that “a little bloodletting would only do good to Servia”, and 
that Prince Nikola was enquiring in Belgrade about Serbia’s intentions, and 
had proposed a joint plan of action.71 
Suspicious  about  Serbia’s  connection  with  the  Three  Emperors’ 
League, the Foreign Office was trying to gather information in St Peters-
burg and Vienna as well. Baron Alexander Jomini, an advisor in the Russian 
foreign ministry, told the British chargé d’affaires, Sir William Doria, that 
Prince Milan “had gone there solely in search for a wife”. However, Doria 
noticed “a sort of complacency” in the attitude of Jomini and especially of 
the Austrian ambassador in St Petersburg, Baron Langenau, towards the 
troubles of the Porte in Herzegovina.72 The French ambassador in St Pe-
tersburg, General Le Flo, shared Doria’s suspicion about the future plans of 
the Three Emperors’ League in the East.7 
On the other hand, Percy Ffrench sent calming news from Vienna. 
According to him, the Serbian Prince was arranging a marriage with “a 
Roumanian lady”.74 Apart from that, the young Paris-educated Prince was 
68 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, White to Derby, Belgrade, 24 July 1875.
69 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, White to Derby, Belgrade,  August 1875.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Doria to Lord Derby, St Petersburg, 4 August 1875.
7 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Doria to Lord Derby, St Petersburg, 9 August 1875.
74 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Ffrench to Lord Derby, Vienna, 4 August 1875.M. Ković, The 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina 67
looking for “a few days distraction from the monotonous solitude of his life 
in his own country”. From the perspective of Percy Ffrench, the Prince, in 
his country of peasants which “possesses neither proprietors nor a middle 
class”, was “entirely cut off from any civilized intercourse, in hourly dread 
of assassination”, surrounded only by his ministers and his aides-de-camp, 
half-civilized themselves. The British diplomat concluded this “Balkanist 
discourse” with words that now appear strangely ironical and prophetic at 
the same time: “Yet this is a State which aspires to be the ‘Piedmont’ of the 
Principalities, which has raised the nucleus of an army destined, according 
to the Servian creed, to march one day against Turkey and overthrow her, 
and found and become the head of a Southern Slavonia, which is to absorb 
all the other Danubian and Austro-Turkish provinces of that race.”75
The reports from Belgrade, however, were much more alarming. Ac-
cording to White, only one day after Prince Milan’s departure for Vienna, 
a committee for Herzegovina was set up openly in Belgrade. The Serbian 
authorities, which ten days earlier had put a ban on setting up the committee, 
now did nothing to prevent it. Moreover, White was informed that about one 
hundred volunteers had left Serbia to join the insurrection in Herzegovina.76 
Without waiting for either Elliot’s or Derby’s approval, White asked the Ser-
bian foreign minister, Milan Bogićević, for an explanation. Bogićević assured 
him that Serbian officials were not involved in any way in the despatching of 
volunteers, “but he admitted departure of a few volunteers”, and confirmed 
that aid was being raised for the people of Herzegovina.77 
Within the next few days Serbia indeed became the source of trou-
bling news. In addition to Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, the Porte was 
now accusing Serbia too of providing help to the rebels in Herzegovina.78 
According to the news from Constantinople, and even from Paris, as volun-
teers were pouring in from Dalmatia and Montenegro, Serbia kept sending 
her volunteers, and the Serbian army was on manoeuvres in the border areas 
opposite Višegrad.79 At the request of the Porte, Lord Derby took official 
steps to dissuade the governments in Vienna, Cetinje and Belgrade from 
carrying on with their actions.80
75 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Ffrench to Derby, Vienna, 4 August 1875.
76 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, White to Elliot, Belgrade,  August 1875.
77 Ibid. 
78 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Elliot to Derby, 11 August 1875.
79 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Elliot to Derby, 11 August 1875; NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 
9, Memorandum communicated to the Earl of Derby by the Marquis d’Harcourt, 15 
August 1875.
80 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Derby to Ffrench, London, 12 August 1875; and Derby 
to Elliot, London, 12 August 1875. Balcanica XLI 68
In reality, both Percy Ffrench and White were well informed about 
the position of both Prince Milan and the Serbian government. The fact 
that the cabinet of Danilo Stevanović was indeed secretly raising aid and 
sending volunteers to Herzegovina led to its conflict with Prince Milan. 
Upon his return from Vienna, the Prince dismissed the cabinet,81 but this 
proved to be an unwise move from the standpoint of his own interests, be-
cause the election brought the openly belligerent Liberals to power. White 
reported that, at the reception for the Consular body held on 22 August 
1875, the Prince “required moral support from the foreign Powers for the 
preservation of peace”.82 The Prince said that he had to face the war-minded 
Assembly, and that he could not obtain support from any man of influence 
in Serbia with the exception of Jovan Marinović, who favoured negotia-
tions over war, but was not a popular politician.8 The new course of Stevča 
Mihailović’s government was obvious from the fact that Serbia’s military 
preparations were now made quite overtly.84
That things were getting worse was also clear from White’s report 
that “the Revolutionary Committee” in Belgrade “held several hundreds na-
tives of Bosnia ready to proceed there” even under the previous Serbian gov-
ernment.85 On 18 August 1875, Elliot reported that the Ottoman officials 
had no information about the insurrection spreading from Herzegovina to 
Bosnia. Yet, a day later, Buchanan learnt from the Austrian foreign ministry 
that the insurrection had indeed spread to Bosnia, and that the Habsburg 
authorities accused Prince Milan of forgetting the promise of neutrality he 
had made in Vienna.86
The scene was now rapidly changing. On the very same day Buchan-
an informed the Foreign Office about the outbreak of the insurrection in 
Bosnia (19 August), and the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Count 
Ignatiev, proposed to the Porte on behalf of the three Emperors to accept 
mediation by the Consuls of the Great Powers, who would meet up with 
the rebel leaders and persuade them to agree to the administrative and tax 
reforms. This was exactly what the British had feared the most. The Three 
Emperors’ League was seizing the initiative in the East. Disraeli suspected 
81 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, White to Derby, Belgrade, 16 August 1875 and 17 Au-
gust 1875; see Č. Popov, “Srbija u Istočnoj krizi 1875–1878”, in Istorija srpskog naroda, 
vol. V-1, ed. V. Stojančević (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1981), 70; Ekmečić, 
Ustanak u Bosni, 19–140.
82 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, White to Derby, Belgrade, 2 August 1875.
8 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, White to Derby, Belgrade, 17 August 1875. 
86 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 9, Buchanan to Derby, 19 August 1875.M. Ković, The 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina 69
that it was the beginning of the partitioning of the Ottoman Balkan pos-
sessions.87 In fact, the Consular Commission was the first clear sign that the 
Great Powers were openly taking the leading role in the events in the East. 
Thus, the change of government in Serbia, the spread of the uprising to 
Bosnia and the setting up of the Consular Commission marked the begin-
ning of a new phase in the course of the Eastern Crisis.
* * *
A clear and comprehensive explanation of the causes of such a complex 
phenomenon as the outbreak of the insurrection in Herzegovina can only 
be given by analyzing all the relevant sources of different provenance. The 
British sources tell only part of the story, but the importance of the British 
perspective became obvious in the continuation of the Eastern Crisis, when 
Britain snatched the leading role in the events.
The British sources support the conclusion of most historians that the 
immediate cause of the insurrection was agrarian discontent, especially tithe 
collecting. Considering “external influences” in the outbreak of the insurrec-
tion, the British emphasized the role of Austria-Hungary and Montenegro. 
They saw behind these countries the shadow of the Three Emperors’ League, 
which was perceived as the main threat to the Ottoman Empire and to 
British interests in Europe. It was suspected that the uprising might be used 
as a pretext for dividing the Sultan’s European possessions between Austria-
Hungary and Russia, in which case Austria-Hungary would enter Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Montenegro was seen as a tool of the Three Emperors’ 
League, while Serbia was not perceived as directly involved in the events 
in Herzegovina. Later on, at the time of Prince Milan’s visit to Vienna and 
with the beginning of the despatching of volunteers from Serbia to Her-
zegovina, the British diplomats came to think of Serbia as another tool of 
the Three Emperor’s League. As the crisis evolved and Russia’s involvement 
grew deeper and more obvious, the British shifted their suspicion from Vi-
enna to St Petersburg. Nonetheless, the Three Emperors’ League remained 
the main focus of their attention until the end of the Eastern Crisis.
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